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Indigenous Law at the Supreme Court of Canada 
 
The Honorable Russell Brown* 
 
First, let me thank Dean Kirgis for his kind invitation to visit the 
University of Montana, and to Professors Zellmer, Bryan and Mills, and 
their colleagues for all the work they have done to make this visit so very 
rewarding. 
I actually feel very much at home in Montana.  I developed 
something of a love affair with this state when I was 12 years old and my 
aunt and uncle took me to Glacier National Park.   
And when my own children were younger and we still lived in 
Alberta, we camped most years in Montana, and not only in Glacier, but 
on the banks of the Yellowstone River, the Musselshell, and the Jefferson.  
We’ve listened to folk bands in Great Falls and watched Fourth of July 
fireworks at Billings Heights.  My family made repeat visits in successive 
years to the Great Northern Carousel in Helena and to the Museum of the 
Rockies in Bozeman.  My younger son and I have ridden horseback on 
trails cut as far north as Chief Mountain and as far south as Paradise 
Valley.  And in my living room in Ottawa is a very large oil painting 
depicting the view looking south to Goat Haunt and Mt. Cleveland, in 
Glacier National Park. 
I recount all this not to convey some sense of Montana provenance 
or street credibility, but rather to explain why I say—as odd as it might 
sound to hear this coming from someone in my position—that I feel more 
at home in Montana than I do almost anywhere else (including eastern 
Canada, where I have set up camp since my appointment to Ottawa).  And, 
to explain why I say that I’m very happy to be back.   
In late July 2015, during the same week that the Prime Minister 
asked me to accept an appointment to the Supreme Court, our then Chief 
Justice Beverley McLachlin (a previous visitor to this law school, I might 
add, who was raised not far from here, just inside Alberta) was asked at a 
public event to identify the type of case that she foresaw dominating our 
docket in the years ahead.  Her answer was “section 35 claims,” which 
refers to the section of our 1982 constitutional document which recognizes 
and affirms the aboriginal rights of the Indigenous peoples of Canada.   
                                                 
* Justice, Supreme Court of Canada. 
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This answer was unsurprising, since the law on § 35 was already 
in significant flux, and since cases on § 35 had occupied much of the 
Court’s docket over the previous 15 years.  But it was also foreboding, 
since the pace of developments over the past 15 years had left many 
wondering “what more could there be?” 
I thought then, however—and I still think now—that she was 
probably right.  So, let me first review what had already come by then. 
The history of colonial settlement and the exercise of colonial 
state power in Canada over Indigenous peoples is, broadly speaking, not 
dissimilar to yours in that it is one of European settlement, Indigenous 
displacement, treaties, reserves, denial of civil rights, and a gradual 
extending of civil rights.  But there are particular features of that history 
in Canada that merit special mention. 
First, treaties have come late to the game in certain parts of the 
country.  Canada treated with its Inuit population only 25 years ago:  in 
1993, with the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement.1  And only a very small 
part of British Columbia, our westernmost and third-largest province, has 
been formally ceded by treaties, and treaty negotiations over the rest of 
that province as well as much of the northern territories are ongoing today.  
As I will come to explain, this dearth of treaties in British Columbia has 
influenced significantly the development of our law under § 35. 
Second, our federal structure—which was constitutionally 
enshrined in 1867 when the present Canadian state was formed by the 
confederation of three former British colonies in what is now eastern 
Canada—is designed in such a way that necessitates the involvement of 
both the federal and provincial governments in treaty negotiations.2  And 
that is because our 1867 constitutional document confers jurisdiction on 
the federal government for “Indians, and Lands reserved for Indians,” but 
also allows provincial governments to affect the interests of such 
“Indians” through the passage of provincial laws of general application on 
matters falling within their own jurisdictional responsibilities.  Those 
provincial responsibilities include property and civil rights, which 
empowers provinces to regulate most types of industrial activities, and 
management of Crown (that is, public) lands, which empowers provinces 
to regulate activities such as mining and lumbering.  
                                                 
1.  Nunavut Land Claims Agreement Act, S.C. 1993, c. 29. 
2.  Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 
(UK), 1982, c. 11, formerly the British North America Act, (UK), 30 & 31 Victoria, c. 
3. 




It becomes readily apparent, then, that both the federal 
government and the provinces have to be at the treaty table.  Just as a 
simple illustration of why that is so, consider the federal jurisdiction over 
“Lands reserved for Indians.”  Those lands would be Crown lands—that 
is public lands, the management of which is a provincial responsibility.  
So clearly our Constitution contemplates that both orders of government 
have a role in the Canadian state’s relationship with Indigenous peoples. 
So, I mentioned three distinct features of our history that are 
important to set the stage: first, the dearth of treaties in some areas; and 
second, the nature of our federal division of powers.  Now the third is 
something that is much more recent.  And, unfortunately, it also represents 
among the darkest stains on Canadian history. 
Starting in the 1880s, Canada separated Indigenous children from 
their parents, sending them to residential schools, often far away from their 
families and ancestral lands.  This was not done to educate them, but to 
break their link to their culture and identity.  This was part of a deliberate 
and coherent policy to eliminate Indigenous peoples as distinct peoples 
and—against their will—to assimilate them, so far as was thought 
possible, into the Canadian mainstream.  Funded by the federal 
government and run by the Roman Catholic and Protestant churches, the 
system expanded to 139 schools over the years, through which at least 
150,000 Indigenous children were passed through.  Although most of the 
schools had closed by the late 1970s—the one in the area in which I grew 
up closed in 1976—the last federally supported residential schools closed 
only in the late 1990s.3 
For the children in these schools, life was lonely and alien.  
Buildings were poorly located, poorly built, poorly heated and poorly 
maintained.  The staff was limited in numbers, inadequately trained and 
inadequately supervised.  Discipline was harsh, daily life highly 
regimented, and sexual and physical abuse widespread.  Indigenous 
languages and cultures were suppressed and denigrated.  Educational goals 
and technical training often gave way to the drudgery of chores necessary 
to keep the schools self-sustaining. 
And I can tell you—and this is my personal testimony, since I was 
raised in a community where children I knew went to these schools—that 
these schools destroyed families and family life.  They impaired 
                                                 
3.  See, generally, Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission of Canada, (2015), http://nctr.ca/assets/reports/Final%20Reports/ 
Principles_English_Web.pdf. 
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community life.  The echoes in these communities reverberate today, 
where both victims and abusers often continue to live side by side.  Only 
now, by way of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission that reported to 
Parliament in 2015, are we beginning to understand the depth and breadth 
of damage done.   
Inasmuch as residential schools were designed, and, indeed this 
was their prime mission, to transform Indigenous children into something 
less Indigenous or, preferably non-Indigenous, this aspect of our history 
has also formed an important backdrop to the understanding of the content 
of § 35.  Although I haven’t heard it put this way, I see the legacy of those 
schools playing out in this sense: they give a kind of normative force to § 
35’s guarantee of aboriginal rights.  Because they show how things can, 
even in a relatively benign country like Canada, go terribly wrong when 
one doesn’t consider Indigenous peoples as rights-holding peoples as 
such. 
As I say “as such” intentionally.  To have aboriginal rights, of 
course, means that one has rights as an aboriginal person.  And when we 
lose track of that premise which underlies the constitutional granting of 
such rights—that these are distinct peoples, with distinct legal rights—we 
fall into the same trap into which our settler forbears also fell.  That natural, 
but deeply unfortunate human trait, of wanting people to fit a particular 
mould that we find comfortable and familiar.  And of course, there are 
many examples in recent history of that sort of hubris, and of its easy 
descent into inhumanity.  And residential schools, which for this very 
reason I say an important backdrop to § 35, is a peculiarly Canadian 
example. 
So, this was the historical background that led to our 1982 
constitutional document, the Constitution Act 1982, and its enshrinement 
in § 35 of aboriginal and treaty rights. Now, how has my court applied § 
35 so far? 
I am going to canvass three ways.  The first two, giving substance 
to § 35’s affirmation of (1) aboriginal rights, and (2) development of a 
doctrine of aboriginal title, I’ll deal with a little more briefly than the final 
way, which is the development of a duty to consult.   
Now, a preliminary point.  Who are these rights-holders? Who are 
Canada’s Indigenous peoples, or as our Constitution calls them, 
“aboriginal” peoples?  The text of § 35 itself answers that question.  It 
specifies three groups:  the “Indians” (as they were then called—now, 
typically, the term “First Nations” is used); the Métis; and the Inuit. 




Just who is Métis is the subject of some controversy.  It typically 
refers to the descendants of the fur traders and First Nations women in 
western Canada, and I just learned from Professor Johnstone last evening, 
in places like the South Fork of the Teton River. Although some other 
people of mixed European and Aboriginal heritage claim to be Métis as 
well.  I expect that “who is Métis” may land in our lap someday, and I 
won’t say more on that today.   
So: aboriginal rights; aboriginal title; and duty to consult.  Now 
let me canvass each of these, and as I do so, I’ll identify some areas of—
let us say—tension.  Some have been resolved, some have been sort-of 
resolved, and some have been resolved not at all. And then I’ll discuss 
where I think we might be going with all this; in other words, what lies 
ahead in our legal development? 
So, let me first turn to aboriginal rights.  First question: how are 
“aboriginal rights different from aboriginal title?”  In 1996, in a case called 
Van der Peet, my Court distinguished aboriginal title from aboriginal 
rights, the latter being aboriginal interests in land falling short of title. 4  
This is significant if you consider Indigenous communities that traversed 
large stretches of land over the course of the seasons or years—for 
example, to follow caribou or buffalo—or Indigenous communities that 
made use of the land for fishing or hunting purposes, but whose occupation 
was seen as falling short of supporting a claim of title.  These aboriginal 
rights might include site-specific rights to engage in particular activities, 
practices, customs and traditions on lands that were integral for those 
purposes, but which also might be integral to other Indigenous 
communities that also historically made use of those lands. 
Now all this may sound straight forward enough, depending on 
your standpoint, but let me point to one particular area of tension.  Being 
where the way in which Indigenous people use the land has changed. Does 
the aboriginal right evolve without the use, so as to continue to protect it? 
While the Court said in two companion cases called Marshall and Bernard 
that these practices, customs and activities can evolve over time, they have 
not always been considered to evolve in ways asserted by the Indigenous 
communities themselves.5  For example:  in Lax Kw’alaams v. Canada, in 
2011, my Court held that cultural practices of exchanging one particular 
                                                 
4.  R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507. 
5.  R. v. Marshall; R. v. Bernard, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 220. 
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species of fish and products derived from it did not today ground a 
commercial fishing right in all species of fish.6   
So, what are some examples of aboriginal rights that have been 
protected?  In its 1990 decision in Sparrow v. The Queen, my Court held 
that the practice of fishing for food, having been conducted prior to contact 
with Europeans, was protected under § 35.7  But, in Van der Peet, the Court 
put a lid on that by ruling that there was no aboriginal right to market the 
fish caught for that purpose.   
In two other companion cases in 2006 called Sappier and Gray, 
my Court recognized an aboriginal right to harvest logs for personal use: 
to build a house, for firewood and to make furniture.8  But again not for 
commercial use. 
So, that’s a thumbnail sketch of aboriginal rights.  Let me turn to 
aboriginal title.  And just to revisit the distinction: whereas an aboriginal 
right is a right to use land, aboriginal title confers a right to the land itself. 
In a 1997 judgment called Delgamuukw, my Court developed a 
test for determining whether an Indigenous claimant holds title to land. 9  
The claimant must show occupancy at the time when the Crown—which, 
I’ll say for present purposes is shorthand for the government, which is the 
earlier colonial British state, or the later Canadian state—asserted 
sovereignty over that land.   
So, to reiterate: a claim of aboriginal title hangs on the claimant 
showing occupancy at the time the settler state asserted itself. Meaning, 
the land must have been occupied by the claimant’s people prior to the 
assertion of Crown sovereignty.  But also, the Court in Delgamuukw said 
that Indigenous occupation must have been exclusive. (More about that in 
just a moment).  And, if present occupation is being relied upon as proof 
of pre-sovereignty occupation, there must be continuity between present 
and pre-sovereignty occupation. 
Now, back to the requirement of “exclusive,” which—as you 
might guess—presents an area of some difficulty.  Now, obviously, a 
measure of exclusivity is necessary because otherwise it would be possible 
for more than one Indigenous group to have title over the same piece of 
land.  But, at the same time, my Court has cautioned that some flexibility 
                                                 
6.  Lax Kw’alaams Indian Band v. Canada (Attorney General), 
[2011] 3 S.C.R. 535. 
7.  R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075. 
8.  R. v. Sappier; R. v. Gray, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 686. 
9.  Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010. 




should be allowed.  So, for example, in Delgamuukw it said that where 
other Indigenous groups were present on the land or frequented the land, 
joint title might exist based on shared exclusivity.  This notion of joint title 
can obviously get complicated—and we haven’t yet had to decide it. 
Another area of tension is in that last requirement: not just that 
there be prior occupation, and that it be exclusive, but that the occupation 
be continuous.  And indeed, there has been significant criticism of that last 
requirement, since it suggests the need for an unbroken chain of continuity 
between prior and present occupation in circumstances where any break in 
that chain might well have been the product of an unjust colonial 
displacement. 
And so, my Court has since, in the 2015 case of Tsilqot’in (the 
only decision in which the Supreme Court has actually recognized 
aboriginal title), clarified that continuity of occupation is not necessary.10  
It is, rather, merely an evidentiary basis by which present occupation may 
be used to prove prior occupation.  But that does not mean that an 
aboriginal group cannot claim land that was occupied pre-sovereignty but 
has not been occupied since, even if that land is quite distant from 
presently occupied lands.   
Now how far will that be taken?  It remains to be seen.  I think in 
most cases, realistically speaking, most claims will be using continuity 
between present and prior occupation to support title claims. 
Another area of difficulty: what about Indigenous groups that 
were mobile—what are sometimes called “nomadic” or “semi-nomadic” 
peoples?  How are they to prove that they occupied or possessed a territory 
and thus can claim aboriginal title to land?   
And this is a particularly acute challenge for the Inuit, who, true 
enough, would confine themselves to a particular area, but a very large 
area, and would not remain at a single place within that area 
“continuously.”  
In a case 22 years ago called Adams, then Chief Justice Lamer 
opined that such peoples could not claim for title, but rather could claim 
for the lesser aboriginal right to use specific tracts of land for specific 
purposes.11  About ten years later, in Bernard, my Court took a second 
look at the issue and decided that yes, in fact, such peoples can claim title 
to lands, but the strength of their claim would depend on the evidence.12  
                                                 
10.  Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 256. 
11.  R. v. Adams, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 101. 
 12.  R. v. Bernard, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 220. 
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Meaning, whether they could show sufficient possession or occupation 
depended on “all the circumstances,” but that those circumstances would 
include the nature of the land and the manner in which it was used.  So, 
sufficient possession or occupation at the time of the assertion of Crown 
authority could be established in a variety of ways, ranging from 
construction of dwellings, cultivation and enclosure of fields, or regular 
use of definite tracts for hunting and fishing.  What “possession” means, 
then, for these purposes, is a highly contextual, nuanced concept.   
The author of the lead judgment in Bernard was then Chief Justice 
McLachlin.  A concurrence was written by Justice LeBel—a significant 
concurrence, I think, from the standpoint of nomadic Indigenous groups.   
Common law concepts of property must, he said, be modified in 
order to develop a possession/occupancy standard that incorporates 
aboriginal understanding of property rights and use, informed as it was by 
geography, climate, terrain and their way of life.  Any other approach, he 
cautioned, effectively treats Canada as unoccupied, thereby perpetuating 
the old injustice of terra nullius—meaning that the land belonged to 
nobody and was open to the first European who claimed it. 
Without stating where I would land in a future case, I will say that 
I find this concurrence quite compelling.  Surely the pre-Crown 
sovereignty way of life must be accounted for, and the nature of the land 
itself and the way in which it was used must be accounted for.  Particularly 
where, I might add, many of these claimants still remain on that land and, 
particularly in the case of the Inuit, still use it for much the same purposes 
and in broadly similar ways. 
Now there’s another decision of importance on the challenge of 
nomadic or semi-nomadic peoples establishing prior occupation or 
possession.  And it’s a case I’d mentioned earlier, the 2015 case of 
Tsilhqot’in, decided just a few months before my appointment to the 
Supreme Court.   
In that case, the Supreme Court overturned a decision of a lower 
appeals court which held that aboriginal title could not be proven without 
evidence of exclusive, intensive possession of the definite tract of land 
claimed.  In doing so, the Supreme Court accepted that a historically 
mobile (“semi-nomadic” the Court called it) Indigenous group could 
establish exclusive occupation.  And, as a result, it granted the historic first 
declaration of aboriginal title over a definite tract of land.   
Now, I should probably mention something about the kinds of 
evidence that Canadian courts hear in title claims. 




The evidence in these cases is, in two words, complex and 
voluminous.  It typically includes evidence of: pre-Crown sovereignty 
occupation by archaeologists, anthropologists, elders (for whom the rules 
of evidence are relaxed so that they can give evidence of their history has 
passed down through oral traditional stories and songs); reports on 
excavations; journals of early explorers; evidence of family histories and 
genealogical linkages that establish relationships between the land and its 
current occupants; and post-Crown sovereignty resettlements and 
relocations.   
As to the volume, just as an example, the Tsilhqot’in trial took 339 
trial days, spread over five years. 
Now, that’s (1) aboriginal rights and (2) aboriginal title.  Which 
were, you will recall, two of the three ways in which the inclusion of § 35 
in our Constitution of 1982—the section that enshrined aboriginal rights—
have changed the legal landscape.  Or, more accurately, two of the three 
ways in which § 35 allowed the Supreme Court of Canada to change the 
legal landscape. 
Now, (3) the third way, and where much of the action is under § 
35 because, in part, these cases take so long to try—the judicial recognition 
and development of something called the duty to consult. 
The original rationale for the duty to consult was as follows.  
Remember, I’d mentioned that very little of the territory of the province 
of British Columbia—our third largest province—was ceded by treaty.  
And so, treaty negotiations are happening now, and have been for nearly 
30 years.  And they are taking a long time.  The reasons for this are 
complex but led to the obvious problem that in the meantime, the world 
doesn’t stop moving. And, in particular, lumbering, mining, oil and gas 
exploration, and other resource extraction and development on lands being 
claimed under the treaty process does not stop happening. And, even more 
particularly, applications for provincial Crown licences to log, mine, build 
a road, develop a ski resort, whatever—all keep happening.  
So, what to do where claims to lands and territories are being 
pursued through treaty negotiations, while the integrity of that land or 
those territories, or their value (howsoever one defines that value) is being 
depleted via resource extraction or development?  In a landmark case 
called Haida Nation, the Supreme Court gave the answer.13 
                                                 
13.  Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests), [2004] 3 
S.C.R. 511. 
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Just offshore from the north coast of British Columbia is located 
an archipelago of islands called Haida Gwaii—formerly the Queen 
Charlotte Islands—the traditional homeland of the Haida people, who 
have been in treaty negotiations since the early 1990s, pursuant to a claim 
made over 120 years ago.  The islands of Haida Gwaii are heavily forested 
and have been logged since before the First World War, although 
substantial old-growth forests still stand. 
So, in the 1990s, the British Columbia government approved 
transfer of an old timber harvesting license to Weyerhaeuser, a large forest 
company.  And the Haida challenged this transfer in the courts, invoking 
§ 35.  And in finding for the Haida, the Supreme Court said this: that the 
purpose of § 35 is to facilitate “reconciliation” between the assertion of 
Crown sovereignty by the British then Canadian state over land, and the 
prior occupation of that land by Indigenous peoples.  Achieving this 
reconciliation is a constitutional imperative, which flows from something 
the Court referred to as “the Honour of the Crown.”  Meaning, the Crown 
has a duty to act honourably in all its dealings with Indigenous peoples. 
And that duty to act honourably means that the Crown cannot ride 
roughshod over Indigenous peoples’ interests where claims affecting those 
interests are being seriously pursued in treaty negotiations.  This means 
the Crown must consult and reasonably accommodate those interests 
pending resolution of the claim. 
The point is that, while negotiations are being held, the Crown 
cannot make any decision allowing exploitation of claimed lands without 
consultation with the affected Indigenous peoples.  This does not mean 
handing the Indigenous peoples a veto; while the goal may be to obtain 
consent, that is not the requirement.  Rather, consultation is the 
requirement. 
Now, to what extent does the Crown have to consult?  How close 
to consent must it get?  The answer is necessarily abstract, in that the extent 
of consultation will be influenced by the strength of the claim, and the 
extent to which the proposed activity would diminish what is being 
claimed.  In the face of a strong claim and proposed development that 
would ravage the land, the consultation must be, as we say, “deep.”  In the 
face of a weak claim with minimal impact on the land, the consultation 
need not be so extensive. But true consultation there must be.  
So, a duty to consult exists during that long holding period where 
we are in treaty negotiations.  But what about once we have a treaty?  Does 




the duty to consult evaporate, or does it continue to bind the Crown in 
respect of its treaty partner? 
In 2005, in a case called Mikasew Cree, the Court extended this 
consulting requirement beyond the negotiation-towards-a-treaty stage, to 
a case where an actual treaty right was at stake, but where there was 
uncertainty about the scope of that treaty right.14  So, while that uncertainty 
is being sorted out in the courts, the Crown must consult on any matter 
that might undermine that potential right—usually where a company is 
seeking to extract resources from the disputed land. 
And then, in 2014, in a case called Grassy Narrows, the Court 
went further, by stating that the duty to consult still applies even after the 
negotiation of a treaty, and even where everyone clearly understands the 
scope of the treaty right.15  So, for example, if the Crown is exercising its 
powers which were reserved to the Crown under a treaty to allow 
settlement, mining, or logging on treaty lands, the Crown must still consult 
with its Indigenous treaty partners. 
These pronouncements have opened up a whole new doctrine 
geared to protecting aboriginal rights under § 35.  And, as you might 
imagine, it has required governments to develop new policy frameworks 
at the licence application and issuance stage in order to implement this 
doctrine.   
The Supreme Court has revisited, and mostly strengthened, the 
doctrine on several occasions since those early cases.  And I’ll turn now 
to briefly outline the most important handful of those cases, beginning 
with its 2010 decision in Rio Tinto v. Carrier Sekani.16 
In Rio Tinto v. Carrier Sekani, the Crown approved excess sales 
of hydro-electric power by Rio Tinto, sourced from a dam located not far 
from where I was raised, as it happens, on the traditional lands of the 
member First Nations of the Carrier Sekani Tribal Council.  Much of the 
damage to their lands had already occurred in the 1950s, with the 
construction of the dam which diverted the Nechako River and 
permanently displaced several aboriginal communities.   
                                                 
14.  Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada (Minister of Canadian 
Heritage), [2005] 3 S.C.R. 388. 
15.  Grassy Narrows First Nation v. Ontario (Natural Resources), 
[2014] 2 S.C.R. 447. 
16.  Rio Tinto Alcan Inc. v. Carrier Sekani Tribal Council, [2010] 2 
S.C.R. 650. 
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Now, obviously, at the time Indigenous people were not consulted 
(since this was 30 years before § 35 even existed, and 50 years before the 
duty to consult was recognized).  But in 2010, they argued that this new 
energy purchase agreement should be subject to consultation since it 
meant further diversion of the water of the Nechako River, which formed 
part of its claim area.  For its part, the Crown argued that because most of 
the damage was already done, it owed no duty to consult in approving Rio 
Tinto’s excess sales. The Supreme Court found for the Carrier Sekani and 
said any Crown conduct which might adversely impact any aboriginal 
claim or right must be the subject of consultation.  While historical adverse 
effects cannot be addressed through consultation, the presence of an 
additional adverse effects suffices.    
The other major issue addressed in Rio Tinto v. Carrier Sekani 
concerned the role public boards and administrative tribunals play in 
relation to the duty to consult, where the Crown has by statute delegated 
its decision-making powers to them.  So, for example, if a provincial 
Crown has created by statute a board that decides on all forestry licence 
approvals, or all mining licence approvals, can Crown consultation occur 
through that board?  What the Court said is that this depends upon the 
statutory mandate conferred upon the board or tribunal.  If the mandate 
includes consultation, the board or tribunal may consult.  If not, 
consultation must still occur—the Crown has that duty—even if that 
cannot occur within the procedures of the board or tribunal. Meaning, the 
responsible Cabinet Minister—the Minister of Forests, or the Minister of 
Mines, or the Minister of Indigenous Affairs—must ensure that 
consultation occurs, by whatever means the Crown has at its disposal. 
So, two key issues were addressed and mostly resolved in Rio 
Tinto: (1) what do we do with historical breaches?  (The answer: no 
obligation to consult, on past breaches, although proposed exacerbations 
are subject to the duty to consult); and (2) what about decisions made by 
administrative tribunals?  (The answer: if their mandate allows for 
consultation, it may occur through its processes).  And this latter point was 
affirmed in the other significant case—actually, two companion cases—
decided in 2017, being the cases of Clyde River17 and Chippewas of the 
Thames,18 both of which dealt with the National Energy Board, which is a 
                                                 
17.  Clyde River (Hamlet) v. Petroleum Geo-Services Inc., [2017] 1 
S.C.R. 1069. 
18.  Chippewas of the Thames First Nation v. Enbridge Pipelines Inc., 
[2017] 1 S.C.R. 1099. 




federal administrative tribunal and regulatory agency, and the final 
decision-maker for issuing authorizations for activities such as exploration 
and drilling for the production of oil and gas in certain designated areas. 
And the issue was whether the Crown’s duty to consult could be met by 
that agency’s own investigative and hearing processes, or whether the duty 
could only be met by a Minister of the Crown acting personally.   
And, in both cases, it was affirmed—consistent with Rio Tinto v. 
Carrier Sekani—that it is open to legislatures to empower regulatory 
bodies to play a role in fulfilling the Crown’s duty to consult. While the 
Crown always holds ultimate responsibility for ensuring consultation is 
adequate, it may rely on processes of a regulatory agency to fulfill its duty 
to consult.  In these cases, the Crown’s reliance on the National Energy 
Board was legally sound since its statutory mandate allowed for adequate 
consultation. 
So, this is where the jurisprudence of my Court has come to: a 
significant but still developing body of law on (1) aboriginal rights; (2) 
aboriginal title; and a perhaps maturing body of law on (3) the duty to 
consult.   
Let me close with this point. Until my appointment to the bench, 
I had spent very little of the previous 25 years fretting about aboriginal 
law.  My area of practice was different.  My academic interests were 
different.  So, I approach this either with fresh eyes, or as a dilettante, 
depending on your perspective. 
But it seems to me, whether speaking as someone approaching the 
field afresh or as an untutored neophyte, that we in Canada are entering a 
period in which our legal culture and constitutional law may be 
transformed. Whether this occurs and how this occurs depends on our 
response to the great challenge of our constitutional order as it relates to 
Indigenous peoples. That challenge, as I see it, is how to achieve change 
outside the court process. That is, how to achieve change through 
negotiating provisional outcomes, rather than adjudicating final outcomes, 
where agreement on those final outcomes is lacking. 
Resolving issues in this way seems to be to be more faithful to the 
predicament in which we find ourselves in Canada. My country is 
comprised of overlapping societies, not sealed off from each other in 
watertight compartments. For most of us, Indigenous and non-Indigenous, 
our home is in Canada, and not anywhere else.  An out-of-court process 
by which we negotiate the rules of our co-existence seems to me to be a 
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better response to our predicament.  We are still, in this sense, in an age of 
encounter. 
 
Thank you. 
